Ukraine: how to break the stalemate?

English translation by Yurri Clavilier of Ukraine : comment sortir de l’enlisement ?

The military situation on the Ukrainian front is complicated: as it stands, Putin’s Russia does not have the means to invade Ukraine (its stated objective), and Ukraine no longer has the means (with what it has) to break through the Russian lines…

The stalemate is obvious, even if Ukrainian forces courageously continue to attack this Russian dike which did not break. In fact, the front line barely moved since October, while autumn rains have turned the battlefield into a wide area of mud, and with the coming of winter, the soil is now frozen and covered by snow.

Yet, we had high hopes that Ukrainian forces would break through the front line in their spring offensive, which was expected to succeed at the end of October… This offensive, which was supposed to be massive – a « great offensive » – is therefore a failure. It is also disturbing to note that the crisis in Israel, triggered by Hamas’ atrocious attack on October 7, took place within this time-frame, offering Vladimir Putin the decisive advantage of seeing his war fade into the background of our international concerns, as well as of media attention.

However, the primary reason for this failure lies with the Ukrainians: frightened by the losses incurred at the start of their attacks in early June, they preferred to abandon the massive concentration of resources (in space and time) and the effect of surprise, to adopt a tactic that their Western advisors warned them to avoid. Instead, they opted for a war of attrition against Russia, an adversary with far more resources than their own.

The Ukrainians made the mistake of thinking they could wear the Russians down

When the Ukrainian forces decided in August 2023 that they were going to exhaust the Russian army, they concentrated on a single point, the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove triangle south of Zaporizhzhia, and gave themselves time to break « brick by brick » this Russian-built dike.

At the beginning of October, Ukrainian forces hoped to have decimated the Russian regiments facing them: they should have been drained by the massive losses and by the failure of the Russian command to efficiently manage its manpower. Entire units were killed or wounded, and were ordered to never retreat. »Specialized » teams were even set up to ensure that any Russian soldiers who dared to leave their positions would be mercilessly executed by their own.

Never had the Ukrainian forces been so close to breaking through as in October, when they suddenly saw thousands of young Russian recruits arrive, ill-trained and ill-equipped, but sufficiently numerous to prevent them from getting through. The « window of opportunity » to break through this second line of defence and quickly reach the third and final line of the dike closed before their stunned eyes. At the same time, the war in Israel captured the media’s attention and began to divert some of the military aid provided to Ukraine by its allies, particularly the Americans.

Russian artillery boosted by the arrival of North Korean-supplied shells

Similarly, Ukrainian artillery prioritized « counter-battery fire », a form of combat that also consists of exhausting Russian artillery, by destroying its guns (although their stock is considerable) and blowing up their ammunition depots. The latter became an even more precious commodity, as the shells were heavy and bulky to transport, with thousands of tons of freight to transport and store – a logistical challenge.

Alas, just when the Ukrainians thought they had wiped out some of Russia’s artillery and deprived Putin’s troops of their main asset, the odious dictator of North Korea was supplying millions of shells, admittedly of poor quality, but in numbers that made all the difference. Slightly inaccurate but massive, the Russian artillery could once again put the brakes on any larger Ukrainian offensive, with numerous shots that were always dangerous for those who moved under their fire.

The time conceded to the Russians calcified the front line and the dike that had to be breached

Ukrainians were also fighting against the clock, because by choosing attrition instead of manoeuvre and shock for their attack, they gave the Russians the opportunity to fortify and partially reconstitute their three-line dike, which had – at one point – been sufficiently damaged to give hope of a breakthrough. Tactical errors, then, which the West criticized all the less for having never engaged directly with the Russians, making it all the more complicated to provide some advice, since Western blood did not flow with that of the Ukrainian fighters…

Unlike the 6 June 1944 Normandy landings, which 79 years later mark the beginning of Ukraine’s offensive – 6 June 2023 – and which is also a symbolic reference as the tactic was in both instances to break through a heavily fortified enemy defensive line, the allies were not on the frontline. And the Ukrainians were stunned by the losses endured during their first assaults, which in the end were quite similar to those on the Normandy beaches: wide minefields, bunkers and artillery fire, a deep, solid dike. It’s a good thing the Allies didn’t decide to « wear down » the Nazi troops on the Atlantic Wall in 1944, because we’d probably still be there…

An overestimation of the large-scale combined arms capabilities of Ukrainian forces

The fifty or so countries supporting Ukraine likely overestimated the military skills of its armed forces. During training, all Western instructors expressed their admiration for the unshakeable fighting spirit of the Ukrainians. There was no need to motivate them or explain to them why they should fight; the men and women of this nation in resistance had a resolve made of steel, of titanium even.

There was no doubt that after months of war against the Russian army, Ukrainian soldiers were now hardened and experienced combatants with a steadfast determination to win. However, Western instructors and advisors did little to challenge the Ukrainian units on their « collective skills », and in particular on their ability to combine the various weapons that underpin the power and effectiveness of an armoured force.

It’s not a question of knowing how to use the modern tanks delivered (very gradually) by the allies, the fearsome artillery guns or the missiles supplied with the Himars rocket launchers, but rather how to combine all this on a battlefield saturated by Russian « defences ». What we in our armed forces call « combined-arms manoeuvrers », and which are the basis of armoured power, are in reality not mastered by Ukrainian forces. And we were unwilling or unable to see this.

Weakness of the Ukrainian forces’ combined arms manoeuvre

The complexity of combined-arms manoeuvre lies precisely in synchronizing massive artillery fire as closely as possible with armoured units that deploy immediately behind their destructive power. To use the analogy with the Normandy landings, the combined arms manoeuvre consists in destroying as many obstacles as possible through massive air and land (in this case, naval) bombardment, then moving armoured units forward together, combining tanks and infantry, to break through the enemy’s defensive lines, while calling in new bombardments if obstacles are encountered, while engineers clear away anything that might slow the advance.

The difficulty of a combined arms manoeuvre lies in its coordination, which can be more or less sophisticated depending on the degree of training of the troops and the means of communication available. The Ukrainian forces were supposed to have this knowledge, considered basic in conventional armies, but they hadn’t had the opportunity to practice it since de-sovietization. And it would have taken months of training with complete units to enable the Ukrainians to reappropriate a know-how that was far from being fully mastered.

On the ground, Ukrainian forces demonstrated their ability to fight an infantry battle with small units (typically up to the level of a company of about 50 to 100 people) and to fire artillery – particularly in « counter-battery » fire – but not to combine at a larger-scale all this around a manoeuvre of tanks advancing under mutual protection, while defending against Russian air attacks. The allies could have waited to take the Ukrainian forces to this level, but the latter’s impatience combined with the legitimacy complex of the allies: it’s hard to convince soldiers when you’re not going to fight alongside them, and to explain what they should do when they’ve fought more than we ever did.

Because we didn’t fight alongside them, we may be afraid to criticize

Then the allies fell silent and the Ukrainian forces felt all-powerful, proud also of their decisive victory over the Russians at Kherson only a few months earlier. They had forgotten, however, that at Kherson, Russian general Surovikin had consciously preferred to abandon the ground he had conquered beyond the Dnipro River to avoid the imminent risk of a catastrophic encirclement.

Rather than lose 30-40,000 men and most of their equipment, the Russian general preferred to withdraw as Ukrainian forces were already infiltrating the Russian positions. This unexpected withdrawal limited the casualties to « a few » thousand men, which might otherwise have resulted in a debacle with losses six to seven times greater.

The victory at Kherson once again masked the absence of large scale combined arms manoeuvres by Ukrainian forces, and the challenge they faced seven months later at the Russian dike erected by the same Surovikin on the other side of the Dnipro was of a completely different nature. There was no longer any expectation that Russians may retreat under limited pressure and, above all, no surprises as to where Ukrainian forces would exert it. The Ukrainian forces had neither the numerical superiority nor the surprise to break through… two essential elements in this type of combat.

Admittedly, the allies also inadequately equipped the Ukrainian forces. We remember the endless debates over the delivery of battle tanks, as if Putin’s Russia was going to bomb Germany when it saw Leopard 2 tanks on the battlefield. Not numerous enough, not fast enough, these deliveries have only partially equipped a highly motivated Ukrainian offensive corps.

However, we should refrain from falling into the trap of « a game changing weapon » discourse which is often nothing else than the manifestation of our own frustrations: even if we had sent more of this or that, it probably wouldn’t have made any difference to the outcome of this offensive in such conditions.

What are the solutions to this stalemate?

While some Americans regularly question the military support given to the Ukrainians – which has been going on for almost two years now – the war in Israel has disrupted the flow of support provided to Ukraine. The United States is indeed supplying, from its same limited stockpile, the artillery ammunition and guided bombs used on a massive scale by the Israeli army in its offensive against the Gaza Strip. The upcoming US presidential elections add further pressure on the current and future delivery of military aid packages as in the event of a Trump victory, they could definitely come to a halt.

US support is no longer as certain as it may have been in the past, while European countries are building up their military industry too slowly and their military deliveries to Ukraine are still not enough. Indeed, European Commissioner Thierry Breton’s initiative to organize a coordinated production of one million artillery shells by the European Union was welcome. But it has not really mobilized the EU members, which are still locked in a national paradigm and not devoting sufficient military resources to guarantee support for Ukraine, as if the issue was more industrial than political.

The temptation of Munich, a negotiation to consecrate our defeat

So, to (temporarily) put an end to this war and get the frontline out of this stalemate, it would be tempting to negotiate an agreement with Putin’s Russia. By recognizing some of its – totally illegal and, above all, illegitimate – conquests, the front line could be frozen in place. It’s a Korean-style scenario, with an armistice that has lasted for over 70 years on either side of a demarcation line… without ever having settled anything, and which has even allowed a dynasty of dictators to flourish, as frightening as they are threatening.

Conceding Crimea and part – if not all – of the Donbas to Russia in exchange for a halt to the fighting would be a relief for the whole world, and even for some of the Ukrainian people, who are particularly suffering from this intense and murderous war. Putin’s Russia would emerge strengthened, and would probably wait a few years before resuming what it considers « normal conquests » to fulfil its foolish imperial dream.

Not only would the war resume shortly after, just as the Nazi troops had prepared for the continuation of their war after the « Munich Peace », which initially signalled the failure of the democracies’ will to resist. Worse still, once Ukraine has fallen – for that is Russia’s objective – this war will continue along the same lines. Eastern Poland and the Baltic States will be attacked, and we’ll find ourselves facing a situation we don’t want to contemplate, out of fear as much as cowardice: the quasi-obligation to fight alongside our NATO allies.

If NATO were attacked, it would immediately trigger a coordinated response from its members, but with what means, since the North Atlantic Treaty does not define the commitment of its signatories? Faced with a reconstituted, heavily armoured Russian army, the armies of NATO members would have very little to oppose them, and to believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons to stop an aggression of this kind is hardly credible.

In fact, the weapons of « nuclear deterrence » may prevent a nuclear escalation, but they do not make it possible to wage war without risking one’s own demise, all the more so as Russian aggression would not concern the « vital interests » of the United States, nor those of France or Great Britain…

Are our societies petrified before the prospect of waging war?

In the highly likely event of a Russian military aggression against the Baltic states and Poland, we would have to go to war with our allies using « conventional » means. However, the highest authorities within the French army and the political leaders in charge of our defence do not want to « hear » about it. They convinced themselves that we will not have to fight high-intensity battles, and that France’s (not insignificant) financial efforts can be devoted to investments in the future that often consist of doing a little more of the same… while omitting what is essential in these battles: power and mass, guns, armour and ammunition.

In reality, France has long since lost the means to wage a « conventional » war, so we hide behind nuclear deterrence as if this could absolve us from making a « significant » commitment to Poland or the Baltic states when they are attacked in turn.

Today, only Europe has the financial, technological and human resources to build a defence system that protects our society, our societies, from these threatening empires. Can we still believe that we no longer have any enemies, and that the hundred or so cannons remaining in the French army can constitute more than an undersized part of a security system that we refuse to design: that of the European Union, and not of a medium power that sometimes still sees itself as an empire?

Even if we were to concede a « shameful peace », we would be left with only a few years to prepare our defences against the inevitable aggression of Putin’s Russia, and we would hardly see any mobilization of the European Union in the meantime. On the contrary, each member country, like France, will believe that it is not so concerned, and we will continue to wonder who will build the main battle tank of the future instead of building now the one of the present.

To turn the tide in Ukraine, we have to commit ourselves into the fight

As you read these lines, they may send shivers down your spine: are we going to fight when we haven’t fought a war since Algeria, which we did not even call a war back then? In fact, France has been involved in 32 wars since then – without ever acknowledging it – and we have not yet lost our ability to wage a military engagement that can truly defend, with courage and tenacity, the values we hold dear. The Germans have perfectly understood the danger they are facing, and the Poles are preparing for this confrontation by investing massively in their armoured forces.

If we want to put an end to this war, we – the men and women of Europe – must go and fight alongside Ukrainians, fighting with them in an international coalition, not to unleash a world war against a nuclear power, but by engaging ourselves in an equally « classic » war to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which in fact represents the integrity of the vast world that we care for.

The aim would not be to attack Russia, but to set up an international coalition to retake Ukrainian territory without ever crossing its border, as was skilfully done to drive Iraq out of Kuwait during the first Gulf War. Poland could take the lead in this coalition, triggering a commitment to be joined by other countries, starting with those under immediate threat such as the Baltic states and Finland.

A threat of nuclear retaliation by Russia would be equally implausible in the face of a few otherwise NATO member countries which military endeavour would not even challenge Russia’s « vital interests », and the case of Crimea could be set aside for the first phase. This coalition does not need to be gigantic to enable Ukrainian forces to finally break through the Russian dike and destabilize the system on which Putin’s authority rests. Rolling back Putin means at last giving ourselves the chance to see him overthrown by his own regime, because there can be no lasting peace as long as Vladimir Putin is in power.

Are we afraid of getting involved in this war? We need some courage and pride to protect our freedom, now more than ever.