Is France debating enough about the military consequences of Russia’s war against Ukraine?

English translation by Yurri Clavilier of La France débat-elle suffisamment des conséquences militaires de la guerre russe contre l’Ukraine ?

The temptation here would be to postpone this fundamental and needed discussion following Russia’s invasion until after the war’s end. However, now that the war against Ukraine has been going on for more than 18 months, this debate should be well underway, which is far from being the case.

Understanding this conflict after three decades of denial

In France, as in much of the European Union, we have avoided the slightest collective reflection on military issues for three decades, because they clearly took us back to a past that we wished was only history: that of war as a violent mean to solve our conflicts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as brutal as it was unexpected, caught us off guard and brought us face to face with reality.

And as I belong to the generation of officers who transformed the « conventional » French army into a light expeditionary force – in the absence of any debate whatsoever – I am particularly sensitive to the culture of silence that penalizes the army, but even more so our society.

Involving our society in military matters is the first challenge we face.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz summed it up remarkably well when he said, « We thought we had no more enemies… ». But since this revelation, what have we been doing to break out of this fiction, which is as dangerous as it is anaesthetizing?

In fact, the bulk of military and broader defence issues in France remain the prerogative, not to say the monopoly, of the President of the Republic, who recently still enjoyed being referred to as Jupiter… More seriously, faced with a French society which is discovering that it no longer has a military culture, while at the same time showing a genuine interest about the war in Ukraine, these defence issues can no longer be entrusted to the Elysée alone. Involving our society in military issues, because its very existence depends on them, is the first challenge we face.

In this respect, I’ve noted the astonishing evolution of the French Green party, which constitute a trend that is as structuring as it is destabilizing in terms of the questions it raises about our future. They have invested themselves in security issues in the broadest sense of the term, and one of their leaders, Yannick Jadot, has expressed himself very clearly on the need to support Ukrainian resistance. A change of era?

Only the European Union is large enough to finance a credible defence.

In the face of this crisis, French society is rather energetically involved, and the politicians who never ceased to valorize Putin, mostly acting out of personal interest rather than conviction, are regularly castigated. I’m thinking in particular of all those, from Hubert Védrine, Nicolas Sarkozy to Marine Le Pen, who were constantly trying to get us closer to this mafioso with terrorist methods, rather than recommending that we prevent him from doing any harm.
However, our society has not yet taken the measure of the consequences of this war in military terms, the first of which is undoubtedly to finally build a defence for the European Union that is not reduced to « initiatives » with incomprehensible names and little practical use…

A complete and credible defence triptych

Indeed, the first « lesson » to be learned from Russia’s war against Ukraine is that we – the French – do not have the means to match our ambitions (notably) on defence.
A complete and credible defence system requires three essential components: a nuclear deterrent – which will never be used to wage war and should not be considered a weapon – an armoured force capable of high-intensity combat (which slowly disappeared under my generation, and which is nevertheless the form of warfare raging in Ukraine) and a light expeditionary force capable of intervening, immediately but temporarily, in a civil or military crisis.

Today, only the United States has such a fully fledged system, with China perhaps to a lesser extent, but there are still some doubts concerning its expeditionary force capabilities. The first component alone, nuclear deterrence, requires a financial effort running into tens of billions of euros, and is no longer within the reach of a medium-sized power like France, even if it claims otherwise.
Nuclear deterrence is a global system, based not just on having « two submarines at sea », but on mastering a whole range of systems, from threat detection to the ability to avoid the enemy’s neutralization attempts.

Nuclear deterrence is essential, but too expensive for a medium-sized nation like France

I’ve long thought the opposite, but faced which such a threat we cannot throw away nuclear deterrence. However, the war in Ukraine has also shown that nuclear power is not enough to avoid war, nor to win it… Nuclear power can simply prevent us from having to give in to the blackmail of a similar threat, as V. Putin did during the long months of war.
Today, an effective and lasting nuclear deterrence requires that part of the European Union, if it wishes to do so, unite to protect itself from the threat of devastation, and gather the necessary financial resources.
Is it « impossible » to share such a tool of sovereignty? Well, all of this is precisely a matter of possibilities.

In the absence of sufficient resources, France is paying for a nuclear deterrence at the expense of its military capabilities. If spendings on nuclear deterrence were not cleverly disguised under other headings, such as the Atomic Energy Commission, it would appear disproportionate to what our society can afford, and would literally drain the armed forces dry. Nuclear spending far exceeds the 13% of the Armed Forces’ budget, and probably represents more than a third of the nation’s defence spending, not to mention the collateral effects, such as all those military units dedicated to the protection or support of this nuclear system of non-use.

In other words, if we are to continue to afford nuclear deterrence, we need to share the costs and our neighbours can no longer avoid this situation, as they too have felt largely threatened by Russia.
As for the ultimate decision-making system – who would press the « button »? – the real obstacle to its analysis is our inability to acknowledge the lack of our « Franco-French » means: in fact, we maintain an outdated notion of « sovereignty » if we want to finally build a defence community that is up to the challenges Europe faces. Ursula von der Leyen is at least as credible as Emmanuel Macron when it comes to making difficult decisions.

A non-debated military programming law which neglects the land forces

It is striking to observe how ill-adapted France’s recently adopted military programming law (LPM) is to the challenges raised by the war in Ukraine. This LPM, adopted in 2023, provides for the structuring equipment of France’s army until 2030. Admittedly, the budgetary effort is considerable (+50%), at the limits of what our public finances can support, yet there is no European initiative integrated in this LPM, and of further concern, it provides too little to a vulnerable military combat tool. Not that we need to build up the equivalent of the Russian divisions that are currently being destroyed by Ukrainian soldiers, but how can we fail to notice that the army does not have the central role it would have to play in such a war?

I detest turf wars, which are all too present in my military past. Each army and each of its weapons is important, but it’s the whole that makes up a « corps de bataille ». But who’s doing the fighting in Ukraine today? Ukrainian ships? No, they’re virtually non-existent in the face of Russia’s « prestigious » fleet, which seems quite useless in these battles except when attacked by unmanned drones. The Ukrainian air force? It’s requesting a few dozen F16s to strike in depth and support what the soldiers are doing on the ground: conducting war.

Even the Americans have realized, after their numerous military failures, that war cannot be won with frigates or fighter planes alone. They can help, provided they do not dry up the core component of an army: the army that fights on the ground, the « land army », the one that wins or loses the war.

The French land force is, against all expectations, the big loser in this military programming law: in fact, it has been deprived of the debate that the war in Ukraine should have forced it to hold. And it will not be able to make up for it, especially as its culture of silence prevents it from explaining what is at stake and convincing a society – and therefore political decision-makers – with whom it hardly ever debates…

I’ve already mentioned nuclear deterrence, which cannot constitute an army because it must never be used. But let’s take a moment to reflect on this army which, in its current configuration, could not have sustained more than two weeks of combat similar to those in Ukraine [statement by General Burkhard, Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces in March 2022].
The entire « heavy » armoured component has in fact been folded by my generation: no more main battle tanks (200 will remain in the LPM, and they are rather outdated), no more artillery, which is a major component in these conflicts (a hundred cannons at most), and a barely revived ground-air defence system that had all but disappeared for two decades.

An armaments equivalent to Airbus to replace national « factories » and EU citizens in the French army

A strong army, capable of holding out and rolling back a threatening empire, can be counted in thousands of units of such structuring equipment. This also means that « national » equipment, which is the mainstay of the new LPM, should be replace by European weaponry, which only Airbus like armaments companies should be authorized to manufacture from now on, to avoid the deleterious effects of series that are too limited in size and time.

The perfect example of this is the Leclerc main battle tank: how can we keep such a specifically French piece of equipment in the future, with barely one major upgrade, meanwhile in the same period of time the Leopard, built in the thousands, will see two or three modernization?
I’m sorry to put it bluntly, but the « independence » of the aircraft manufacturer Dassault, which depends almost exclusively on public contracts, is leading us straight « into the wall » if we do not transform this company into a European grouping now, whether the manufacturer likes it or not…

Defence requires considerable resources, which alone we no longer have, but which we can combine with other European nations that are irrevocably bound by a common destiny. How can we fail to admire the solidarity shown by all EU member countries towards Ukraine, much to the bitterness of extremists on all sides who would have us believe that we were not concerned by this conflict on our gates?

Isn’t this the right time to offer EU citizens living in France the chance to enlist in the French army (or reserve), as a first step towards a European army?

A European ground-air defence against missiles and drones specifically

The war in Ukraine also shows us how a hostile empire can bombard a territory from the air without even getting close, using all kinds of missiles and drones. Yet European countries have long since given up on building an effective ground-to-air umbrella. Experts are well aware that there is no such thing as a watertight air defence capable of protecting against everything, but does this mean we should give up on intermediate solutions?

Today, there is fairly good cooperation at NATO level on airspace management, and the ability to intercept a potentially hostile flight with fighter aircraft. However, this system is largely inadequate to counter missiles or drones, which are difficult to detect and even harder to neutralize. While Ukrainians have indeed set up a solid air defence against these threats, it only covers part of the country and requires disproportionate resources, with several combined layers of defence, from cannons to the Patriot missiles.

A European detection and protection network for the most sensitive areas would be an asset in the face of threats that are no longer science fiction. A European missile manufacturer like MBDA is relatively advanced, even if its latest systems – such as the MAMBA – are still a long way behind the performance of the American Patriot, which is once more the result of too little development. Such a European network would be a concrete and welcome initiative in a world where the threat of drones in particular is unlikely to disappear after the war in Ukraine…

Ukrainians resistance, widely supported by a coalition of allies, plays a key role

Ukrainian resistance is another crucial aspect of this war. At the start of this conflict, I wrote that Ukrainians would be unable to resist the might of Putin’s armies. I was wrong!
But Ukrainians resistance – their soldiers halted the invading force and are now fighting to drive them out – is based on several crucial factors: firstly, the decisive support of over fifty countries, including nearly all those of the European Union and the United States. On a side note: Switzerland is an exception as it favours its « neutrality », if not its prosperity, as if it could endure in an environment at war…

In any case, the Ukrainian people would not have resisted so effectively had they not benefited from such support, which, moreover, has been maintained over time.

More than ever, we need alliances, we need « others » to form powerful and determined collectives, capable of defending their society beyond the narrow confines of each individual’s own garden. We have heard too much from the defenders of Putin and chaos that we are not concerned by this war, we must now be able to prevent a crisis or intervene as powerfully and effectively as the defence of our existence requires.

An intermediary corps between a professional army limited in numbers and a civil society disconnected from military issues

Another essential factor in the Ukrainian resistance is the formidable mobilization of its society. This war reminds us how important it is to rely on men and women who are not soldiers by profession. Although France now has a highly skilled professional army, it no longer has any « intermediary body » between its civil society and its professional soldiers. This is all the more disturbing given that this army is supposed to protect the French society, so how can it be so far removed from it?

Without reconstituting a ruinous and ineffective system of military service, why not give further thought to an open « Guard » system to link our society to this professional army? We need an « intermediary corps » to respond to the legitimate desire of a part of the population to contribute to its defence by reviving a military culture, and to create a potential reserve of men and women capable of becoming directly involved if need be.

This Guard, to be built on a European model and scale, would first and foremost be a place of acculturation about shared military and defence issues, whereas the current reserve models only serve to recruit a few profiles that are envied by the Armed Forces, or alternatively to re socialize those society has failed… A Guard useful for the defence of our society can neither be a club of enlightened amateurs, nor a reformatory.

The crucial role of women in rebalancing the defence system

And therein lies an essential factor in securing our society: the role of women in this reappropriation of military culture. They are « just » half of our society, they are the balancing and complementing factor that makes any collective organization truly effective. So, like Ukrainians, let’s demand that women occupy an essential place in this military system, while the current one is still too akin to a swamp of macho crocodiles…

A balanced, shared system for defending our society cannot be achieved unless it starts with parity (men and women), both in decision-making and in action. The war in Ukraine is an opportunity to build back a balanced society that knows and wants to defend itself, without depending dangerously on a superpower that is well-intentioned but is also as distant as it is uncertain. We are, and always will be, confronted by threatening empires which will never let us enjoy our incredible prosperity « in peace »… An involved and extensive defence system is the price we have to pay.

Guillaume Ancel is a former lieutenant-colonel of the French army, formed at Saint-Cyr and a graduate of the Ecole de Guerre and the Institut Royal Supérieur de Défense in Brussels. He left the army in 2005 to join the corporate world. He is also a radio and TV commentator on security and defence issues.
Published by Belles Lettres, his particularly realistic accounts of his military operations, of which he is one of the few officers of his generation to openly talk about, have sparked much debate. He is the author of the blog Ne pas subir.

Bibliography

Guillaume Ancel is co-author of Hélène Blanc (dir.), Goodbye Poutine, Du KGB aux Crimes de guerre, Gingko éditeur, 2023.

Guillaume Ancel, Un casque bleu chez les khmers rouges, journal d’un soldat de la paix, Cambodge 1992, collection Mémoires de guerre, Les Belles Lettres, 2021

Guillaume Ancel, Rwanda, la fin du silence, témoignage d’un officier français, collection Mémoires de guerre, Les Belles Lettres, 2018

Guillaume Ancel, Vent glacial sur Sarajevo, témoignage, collection Mémoires de guerre, Les Belles Lettres, 2017

Guillaume Ancel, Vents sombres sur le lac Kivu, roman, TheBookEdition, février 2014