So, it begins. 6 June, 2023, the operation to liberate Ukraine has (finally) started.

Translated in English by Yurri Clavilier. Original in French: 6 juin 2023, l’opération de libération de l’Ukraine a (enfin) commencé

It gives me great satisfaction to be able to announce in this sixtieth article that the operation to liberate Ukraine has finally begun.
I have a special thought for the men and women who will be killed or wounded in these operations, which are essential for the liberation of Ukraine.

If the stakes are crucial for Ukrainians, they are no less crucial for Europeans, at least to those who wish to defend their conception of society beyond their own prosperity.
The outcome of this offensive will remain uncertain until it is completed. And the purpose of this article is – more than ever – to help decipher the military and political situation in Ukraine, in a « fog of war » that has never been so dense as it was during this major event.

While Mark Milley, the US chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was with his French and British counterparts commemorating the Allied landings in Normandy on 6 June, 1944, Ukrainian forces were launching – on the same day in 2023 and in the greatest of silence – the major offensive for which they had been preparing for months with the help of the fifty countries supporting them.

Logically, this offensive was expected to start by the end of June at the latest, to give Ukrainian forces enough time – 3 months at least – before the arrival of the autumn mud. Its beginning was difficult to detect, since Ukrainians themselves warned us… that they would keep it quiet.

And on 6 June, unlike the days, weeks, and months prior, the Ukrainians said nothing about their military operations. Instead, they focused the media’s attention on the human, economic and environmental disaster unleashed by the Russian armies with the destruction of the Kakhovka dam.

There was nothing trivial about the timing of this catastrophe: the flooding of the Kherson region was a desperate (and despairing) reaction by Russian troops, who understood the danger they were facing against this well-prepared and well-led Ukrainian offensive, as I will come back to it later.

Kakhovka dam destruction, a desperate manoeuvre by Putin’s soldiers to counter the Ukrainian offensive.

On the night of 5-6 June, between 2 and 3 a.m., several explosions were registered by seismic detectors. Tons of explosives were used to destroy this structure, built like a bunker. It was designed to withstand the pressures of water, of course, but also the military bombardments the Soviets wanted to protect themselves against.

The dam is a reinforced concrete and steel structure hard to destroy, which the Russians seized at the very start of the invasion they launched in February 2022. The French newspaper Le Monde published a highly instructive article on this subject last October, when Ukrainian forces were in the process of liberating a large part of Kherson. Putin’s troops were already threatening to blow up the dam, to prevent the Ukrainians from advancing any further and crossing the Dnipro River…

Russian statements concerning the destruction of the dam are contradictory: they first speak of Ukrainian bombardment, but this would have required an extremely heavy strike given the durability of the structure and would have left remnants of impacts or collateral damages on the buildings adjacent to the dam, which is absolutely not the case.

The dam was destroyed by high-powered internal explosions within the structure itself.

As this bombing theory lacked any credibility, the various Russian spokespersons then developed another scenario, worthy of Donald Trump’s « alternative truths »: a Ukrainian commando supposedly attacked the dam…

The structure is deep inside the frontline and closely guarded by Russian troops, so this commando would have had to access the internal explosive charges or transport a few tons of explosives by themselves, i.e., that would have required more than a hundred overloaded soldiers accessing the heavily defended site.

It is rather distressing that a few retired French generals became the spokesmen for such an implausible scenario, especially as the consequences of the destruction confirm the very intention of this operation.

Firstly, Putin’s troops wanted to prevent any crossings of the Dnipro in the Kherson region by Ukrainian forces, who have been continuously harassing Russian positions on the East bank for weeks, which is the first line of defence of Crimea as the peninsula is only a hundred kilometres away.

By flooding this region, the Russian armies made it near impossible to cross for any military equipment other than helicopters. Indeed, such floods create torrents of debris that are unnavigable for anything heavier than inflatable boats. These floods then leave a thick layer of mud that will turn the area into a swamp for several weeks. Mud that no heavy equipment can get through, not on a barge, nor even on a pontoon bridge, which would have to be stretched for miles.

In other words, by flooding the Kherson region, as they were planning to do last October during the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the Russians made this part of the front impassable for several weeks, which accounts for about 200 km of the 1,000-plus kilometres long frontline.

The dam was also an important bridge since the Kherson one was destroyed during the Russian retreat last November. By destroying it, the Russians prevented the Ukrainians from seizing it, but they have in fact renounced any ambition to further invade this part of Ukraine, despite claiming the opposite.

The main objective pursued by destroying the Kakhovka dam is to « free up » and reposition additional Russian troops to counter the Ukrainian offensive.

The consequences of the dam destruction are significant. Dozens probably died, thousands of buildings and structures were damaged, and the environmental disaster is considerable. But, contrary to what some ill-advised commentators have claimed, Crimea is not suffering any immediate consequences, since its drinking water supply does not depend on the canal linking it to the Dnipro as the latter has not been operating for months.

In fact, the main goal of the Russians in destroying this crucial infrastructure in the Kherson region is to change the military power balance. By neutralizing this part of the front for several weeks, Putin’s armies were able to free up high-quality military units that were specifically protecting Crimea. These units immediately left to reinforce the rest of the front, while the Ukrainian offensive launched on 6 June is of course the prime concern of the Russian armies.

The fact that the destruction of the dam flooded most of the southern bank that the Russians had seized, that it destroyed part of their own line of defence established on that bank with substantial losses of equipment, and that it has lasting consequences for the country’s environment (which they claimed to be liberating) is irrelevant to their main problem: Putin’s troops are now trying to resist the operation to liberate Ukraine.

Let’s point out, for those who did not notice, Vladimir Putin’s cynicism in accusing the Ukrainians of flooding the region, while at the same time bombing relief operations in Kherson…

Measured, even restrained reactions from Western governments.

One will wonder about the strange discretion of Western capitals, which were generally very restrained in their condemnation of Russia for this catastrophic and unnatural flood. No doubt they have the information provided by NATO, whose battlefield surveillance systems perfectly monitored and recorded the dam destruction.

The first reason for their restraint is probably their desire not to draw immediate attention to the Ukrainian offensive, the importance and risk of which they are well aware. By revealing their information on the dam destruction and irrevocably condemning Russia, they would also appear to be the key players in this offensive, which must remain Ukrainians.

Only the European Union, through the voice of Josep Borrell, has openly condemned Russia for this catastrophe. But the destruction of the Kakhovka dam was also a staggering manoeuvre, designed to send a threatening message: « Putin’s Russia is capable of anything. Do you really want to take the risk of continuing to support Ukraine?”

The response of most allied countries is therefore clearly coordinated and consists of not overreacting to this umpteenth provocation from Putin’s Russia.

Furthermore, in the United States, a debate relayed by Trump’s supporters is seeking to question the massive support for Ukraine: The White House’s immediate blaming of Russia would have fuelled one of those controversies that American conspiracy theorists are so fond of, as they would have found all sorts of arguments to demonstrate the opposite of the evidence put forward by the American administration.

On the contrary, the gradual emergence of evidence pointing to Russian responsibility is likely to avoid a controversy such as the one still raging over the origin of the Nord Stream gas pipeline explosion.

The main event is the dawn of the Ukrainian offensive.

The destruction of the Kakhovka dam should not shadow the main event in Ukraine, which is the launch of the liberation operation, a major offensive by Ukrainian forces.

It was possible to foresee the offensive within this timing as it was expected, and even more likely as the Russian reaction of destroying the Kakhovka dam and flooding the Kherson region was necessarily in response to a major event. The silence of the Ukrainians since 6 June on their military operations and the Russian frenzy to announce several times a day since then « that they have victoriously countered the Ukrainian offensive » were concordant clues.

But the confirmation of this « great offensive » beginning comes from the commitment of heavy equipment delivered by the allies to the Ukrainian forces: for the first time, Leopard 2 tanks and American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles were identified on the frontline… by their destruction.

Indeed, this Ukrainian offensive can be compared in some ways to the Allied landings of June 1944: as with the « Atlantic Wall », the Russians fortified 1,000 km of the frontline plus 200 in the Belgorod region, which is subject to incursions and aggressive actions by ethnic Russian partisan groups fighting on their own soil.

We remember that the first days of the landings were very difficult, with heavy losses, particularly on Omaha Beach. The Ukrainian offensive is of a similar nature, aiming to pierce the « wall » built over several months by Putin’s armies, and comparably to the Atlantic Wall it is far too long to be permanently impenetrable, but strong enough to not be pierced at the first incursion…

These offensives by Ukrainian forces will therefore generate significant losses, the inevitable price to pay for what is at stake in such an operation: the liberation of Ukraine.

Armoured glass is destroyed by repetition rather than a single projection…

Armoured glass is usually designed to withstand a projectile, and to destroy the glass we learned as a combat technique that we had to keep on hammering at it until it breaks away: it was not a single projectile that could overcome it, but the repetition of multiple assaults that eventually weakened the whole and led to its collapse.

Currently, Ukrainian forces are multiplying their attacks on different points of the front, and starting again as soon as they are blocked or no longer advance fast enough: mine clearance and artillery fire, incursions under the armour of heavily armed vehicles, harassment of Putin’s troops in multiple directions, and withdrawal as soon as Ukrainian units risk coming under fire from the powerful Russian artillery.

It seems that these various assaults are taking place mainly in the Zaporizhzhia region at the centre of the frontline, and in the Donetsk region further north. Once again, these operations are not about being the « steamroller », but about multiplying assaults to weaken defences, cut them down and force Russian troops to move constantly to counter actions wherever they take place, as punctually as temporarily.

It is not one attack, or three, or thirty, but numerous assaults involving spearheading forces (light armour, heavy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles) that will clash with the Russian defence lines until they tire, weaken, and eventually give up.

Ukrainian forces will then engage powerful units held in reserve to rush in and penetrate the Russian positions. Therefore, it is not a unique projection that seeks to penetrate, but a repetition of attacks to bring down the armoured glass that the Russians thought they could erect to protect their brutal and illegitimate conquests.

Talking about Bakhmut, which is probably not the point…

Ukrainians are almost completely silent about these operations, while the Russians tirelessly repeat that they have « stopped the Ukrainian offensive », even though this is not a single attempt, but a succession of operations that they will have to deal with daily.

For several days, if not weeks, we will be facing a barrage of information claiming that the Ukrainian offensive is a failure, meanwhile there will be a delay between what is currently happening on the battlefield and what we know: in the case of the battle of Kherson last October, we did not realize the full extent of the Ukrainian victory until it was practically over.

If, in this context, the Ukrainian President congratulates his troops on their gains around Bakhmut, it is undoubtedly because their commitment is limited and in no way corresponds to a major engagement on this part of the front, which has been hotly contested and is barely relevant militarywise.

Obviously, the desired effect of this major Ukrainian offensive is not to immediately and directly repel all the Russian armies occupying their territory.

But, by breaking through the armoured glass painstakingly built by their invaders, Ukrainian forces will be able to expose them sufficiently to destabilize them. The real stakes are that insecurity will change sides, and that Putin’s troops will feel weakened. Thus, presented with the choice to either stay and die or flee and live, they will rather pick the latter than continuing to take part in the Master of the Kremlin’s game that he himself is likely to play until his own demise, precipating it in the process.

While the Russians played the flood and stalemate card, the Ukrainians are betting on the debacle card, a risky and audacious gamble.

The die is now cast.